dmarc: added subdomain policy handling
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plugins/dmarc
164
plugins/dmarc
@ -24,14 +24,14 @@ DMARC benefits mail server operators by providing them with an extremely reliabl
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See Section 10 of the draft: Domain Owner Actions
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1. Deploy DKIM & SPF
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2. Ensure identifier alignment.
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3. Publish a "monitor" record, ask for data reports
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4. Roll policies from monitor to reject
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1. Deploy DKIM & SPF
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2. Ensure identifier alignment.
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3. Publish a "monitor" record, ask for data reports
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4. Roll policies from monitor to reject
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=head3 Publish a DMARC policy
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_dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;"
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_dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;"
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v=DMARC1; (version)
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p=none; (disposition policy : reject, quarantine, none (monitor))
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@ -50,9 +50,7 @@ _dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.c
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2. install a public suffix list in config/public_suffix_list. See http://publicsuffix.org/list/
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3. activate this plugin (add to config/plugins)
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Be sure to run the DMARC plugin after the SPF & DKIM plugins. Configure the SPF and DKIM messages to not reject mail.
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3. activate this plugin. (add to config/plugins, listing it after SPF & DKIM. Check that SPF and DKIM are configured to not reject mail.
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=head2 Parse dmarc feedback reports into a database
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@ -68,23 +66,9 @@ https://github.com/qpsmtpd-dev/qpsmtpd-dev/wiki/DMARC-FAQ
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2. provide dmarc feedback to domains that request it
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3. If a message has multiple 'From' recipients, reject it
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=head1 AUTHORS
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=head1 IMPLEMENTATION
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1. Primary identifier is RFC5322.From field (From: header)
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2. Senders can specify strict or relaxed mode
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3. policies available: reject, quarantine, no action
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4. DMARC overrides other public auth mechanisms
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5. senders can specify a percentage of messages to which policy applies
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6. Receivers should endeavour to reject or quarantine email if the
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RFC5322.From purports to be from a domain that appears to be
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either non-existent or incapable of receiving mail.
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2013 - Matt Simerson <msimerson@cpan.org>
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=cut
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@ -113,18 +97,17 @@ sub data_post_handler {
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return DECLINED if $self->is_immune();
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# 11.1. Extract Author Domain
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my $from_host = $self->get_from_host($transaction) or return DECLINED;
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my $org_host = $self->get_organizational_domain($from_host);
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my $from_dom = $self->get_from_dom($transaction) or return DECLINED;
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my $org_dom = $self->get_organizational_domain($from_dom);
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# 6. Receivers should reject email if the domain appears to not exist
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if (!$self->exists_in_dns($from_host) && !$self->exists_in_dns($org_host)) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "fail, $from_host not in DNS");
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my $exists = $self->exists_in_dns($from_dom, $org_dom) or do {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "fail, $from_dom not in DNS");
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return $self->get_reject("RFC5322.From host appears non-existent");
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}
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};
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# 11.2. Determine Handling Policy
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my $policy = $self->discover_policy($from_host)
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my $policy = $self->discover_policy($from_dom, $org_dom)
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or return DECLINED;
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# 3. Perform DKIM signature verification checks. A single email may
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@ -139,11 +122,14 @@ sub data_post_handler {
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# 5. Conduct identifier alignment checks.
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return DECLINED
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if $self->is_aligned($from_host, $org_host, $policy, $spf_dom );
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if $self->is_aligned($from_dom, $org_dom, $policy, $spf_dom );
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# 6. Apply policy. Emails that fail the DMARC mechanism check are
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# disposed of in accordance with the discovered DMARC policy of the
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# Domain Owner. See Section 6.2 for details.
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if ( $self->{_args}{is_subdomain} && defined $policy->{sp} ) {
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return DECLINED if lc $policy->{sp} eq 'none';
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};
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return DECLINED if lc $policy->{p} eq 'none';
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my $pct = $policy->{pct} || 100;
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@ -156,7 +142,7 @@ sub data_post_handler {
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}
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sub is_aligned {
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my ($self, $from_host, $org_host, $policy, $spf_dom) = @_;
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my ($self, $from_dom, $org_dom, $policy, $spf_dom) = @_;
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# 5. Conduct identifier alignment checks. With authentication checks
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# and policy discovery performed, the Mail Receiver checks if
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@ -169,14 +155,14 @@ sub is_aligned {
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my $dkim_sigs = $self->connection->notes('dkim_pass_domains') || [];
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foreach (@$dkim_sigs) {
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if ($_ eq $from_host) { # strict alignment
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if ($_ eq $from_dom) { # strict alignment, requires exact match
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "pass, DKIM aligned");
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$self->adjust_karma(1);
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return 1;
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}
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next if $policy->{adkim} && lc $policy->{adkim} eq 's'; # strict pol.
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# default policy is relaxed
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if ( $_ eq $org_host ) {
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# relaxed policy (default): Org. Dom must match a DKIM sig
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if ( $_ eq $org_dom ) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "pass, DKIM aligned, relaxed");
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$self->adjust_karma(1);
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return 1;
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@ -184,13 +170,13 @@ sub is_aligned {
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}
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return 0 if ! $spf_dom;
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if ($spf_dom eq $from_host) {
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if ($spf_dom eq $from_dom) {
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$self->adjust_karma(1);
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "pass, SPF aligned");
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return 1;
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}
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return 0 if ($policy->{aspf} && lc $policy->{aspf} eq 's' ); # strict pol
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if ($spf_dom eq $org_host) {
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if ($spf_dom eq $org_dom) {
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$self->adjust_karma(1);
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "pass, SPF aligned, relaxed");
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return 1;
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@ -200,35 +186,16 @@ sub is_aligned {
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};
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sub discover_policy {
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my ($self, $from_host) = @_;
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my ($self, $from_dom, $org_dom) = @_;
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# 1. Mail Receivers MUST query the DNS for a DMARC TXT record...
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my @matches = $self->fetch_dmarc_record($from_host); # 2. within
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if (0 == scalar @matches) {
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# 3. If the set is now empty, the Mail Receiver MUST query the DNS for
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# a DMARC TXT record at the DNS domain matching the Organizational
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# Domain in place of the RFC5322.From domain in the message (if
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# different). This record can contain policy to be asserted for
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# subdomains of the Organizational Domain.
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my $org_dom = $self->get_organizational_domain($from_host) or return;
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if ($org_dom eq $from_host) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no policy for $from_host (same org)");
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return;
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}
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@matches = $self->fetch_dmarc_record($org_dom);
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if (0 == scalar @matches) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no policy for $from_host");
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return;
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}
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}
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my @matches = $self->fetch_dmarc_record($from_dom, $org_dom) or return;
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# 4. Records that do not include a "v=" tag that identifies the
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# current version of DMARC are discarded.
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@matches = grep /v=DMARC1/i, @matches;
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if (0 == scalar @matches) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no valid record for $from_host");
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no valid record for $from_dom");
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return;
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}
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@ -280,7 +247,7 @@ sub has_valid_reporting_uri {
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}
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sub get_organizational_domain {
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my ($self, $from_host) = @_;
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my ($self, $from_dom) = @_;
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# 1. Acquire a "public suffix" list, i.e., a list of DNS domain
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# names reserved for registrations. http://publicsuffix.org/list/
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@ -290,7 +257,7 @@ sub get_organizational_domain {
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# labels. Number these labels from right-to-left; e.g. for
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# "example.com", "com" would be label 1 and "example" would be
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# label 2.;
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my @labels = reverse split /\./, $from_host;
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my @labels = reverse split /\./, $from_dom;
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# 3. Search the public suffix list for the name that matches the
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# largest number of labels found in the subject DNS domain. Let
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@ -314,7 +281,7 @@ sub get_organizational_domain {
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};
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}
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return $from_host if $greatest == scalar @labels; # same
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return $from_dom if $greatest == scalar @labels; # same
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# 4. Construct a new DNS domain name using the name that matched
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# from the public suffix list and prefixing to it the "x+1"th
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@ -324,26 +291,29 @@ sub get_organizational_domain {
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}
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sub exists_in_dns {
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my ($self, $domain) = @_;
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my ($self, $domain, $org_dom) = @_;
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# 6. Receivers should endeavour to reject or quarantine email if the
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# RFC5322.From purports to be from a domain that appears to be
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# either non-existent or incapable of receiving mail.
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# I went back to the ADSP (from where DMARC this originated, which in turn
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# led me to the ietf-dkim email list where a handful of 'experts' failed to
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# agree on The Right Way to test domain validity. No direction was given.
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# They point out:
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# MX records aren't mandatory.
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# A or AAAA records as fallback aren't reliable.
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# I chose to query the From: domain name and match NS,MX,A,or AAAA records.
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# Since this search gets repeated for the Organizational Name, if it
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# fails for the O.N., there's no delegation from the TLD.
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# That's all the draft says. I went back to the DKIM ADSP (which led me to
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# the ietf-dkim email list where some 'experts' failed to agree on The Right
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# Way to test domain validity. Let alone deliverability. They point out:
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# MX records aren't mandatory, and A|AAAA as fallback aren't reliable.
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#
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# Some experimentation proved both cases in real world usage. Instead, I test
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# existence by searching for a MX, NS, A, or AAAA record. Since this search
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# is repeated for the Organizational Name, if the NS query fails, there's no
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# delegation from the TLD. That's proven very reliable.
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my $res = $self->init_resolver(8);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('NS', $res, $domain);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('MX', $res, $domain);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('A', $res, $domain);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('AAAA', $res, $domain);
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my @todo = $domain;
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push @todo, $org_dom if $domain ne $org_dom;
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foreach ( @todo ) {
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('MX', $res, $_);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('NS', $res, $_);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('A', $res, $_);
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return 1 if $self->host_has_rr('AAAA', $res, $_);
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};
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}
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sub host_has_rr {
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@ -370,12 +340,12 @@ sub host_has_rr {
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};
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sub fetch_dmarc_record {
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my ($self, $zone) = @_;
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my ($self, $zone, $org_dom) = @_;
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# 1. Mail Receivers MUST query the DNS for a DMARC TXT record at the
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# DNS domain matching the one found in the RFC5322.From domain in
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# the message. A possibly empty set of records is returned.
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$self->{_args}{is_subdomain} = defined $org_dom ? 0 : 1;
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my $res = $self->init_resolver();
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my $query = $res->send('_dmarc.' . $zone, 'TXT');
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my @matches;
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@ -384,27 +354,43 @@ sub fetch_dmarc_record {
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# 2. Records that do not start with a "v=" tag that identifies the
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# current version of DMARC are discarded.
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next if 'v=' ne substr($rr->txtdata, 0, 2);
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next if 'v=spf' eq substr($rr->txtdata, 0, 5); # commonly found
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next if 'v=' ne lc substr($rr->txtdata, 0, 2);
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next if 'v=spf' eq lc substr($rr->txtdata, 0, 5); # SPF commonly found
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$self->log(LOGINFO, $rr->txtdata);
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push @matches, join('', $rr->txtdata);
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}
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return @matches if scalar @matches; # found one! (at least)
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# 3. If the set is now empty, the Mail Receiver MUST query the DNS for
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# a DMARC TXT record at the DNS domain matching the Organizational
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# Domain in place of the RFC5322.From domain in the message (if
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# different). This record can contain policy to be asserted for
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# subdomains of the Organizational Domain.
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if ( defined $org_dom ) { # <- recursion break
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if ( $org_dom eq $zone ) {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no policy for $zone (same org)");
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return @matches;
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};
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return $self->fetch_dmarc_record($org_dom); # <- recursion
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};
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "skip, no policy for $zone");
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return @matches;
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}
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sub get_from_host {
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sub get_from_dom {
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my ($self, $transaction) = @_;
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my $from = $transaction->header->get('From') or do {
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$self->log(LOGINFO, "error, unable to retrieve From header!");
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return;
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};
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my ($from_host) = (split /@/, $from)[-1]; # grab everything after the @
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($from_host) = split /\s+/, $from_host; # remove any trailing cruft
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chomp $from_host;
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chop $from_host if '>' eq substr($from_host, -1, 1);
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$self->log(LOGDEBUG, "info, from_host is $from_host");
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return $from_host;
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my ($from_dom) = (split /@/, $from)[-1]; # grab everything after the @
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($from_dom) = split /\s+/, $from_dom; # remove any trailing cruft
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chomp $from_dom; # remove \n
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chop $from_dom if '>' eq substr($from_dom, -1, 1); # remove closing >
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$self->log(LOGDEBUG, "info, from_dom is $from_dom");
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return $from_dom;
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}
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sub parse_policy {
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